Current stabilization policy by anonymous
HE NATIONAL ECONOMY is confronted with
two major problems — inflation and unemployment —
and for the first time since 1957 and 1958 both
problems must be dealt with simultaneously. The
course of events which brought the economy to this
juncture includes the monetaiy and fiscaJ actions of
the past five years.
Until mid-1970, rising unemployment did not ap-
pear to many analysts to be a major problem for the
economy. The rise of unemployment in the first half
of 1970, compared to 1969, was viewed as a temporary
effect of a moderated growth of total demand and as
a necessary cost of establishing price stability. It was
recognized that a somewhat higher and gradually ris-
ing level of unemployment was to be expected for a
short time, as a result of applying more restrictive
stabilization actions in hopes of achieving a relatively
stable price level. By the autumn of 1970, however,
unemployment had risen more than most analysts
expected.
Recent Developments
Recent Price and Itmrloyment ‘trends
The gradual moderation of the pace of price in-
creases in 1970 was similar to price trends during
Wholesale prices of industrial commodities rose at
a3per cent annual rate from May to December,
down from the 3,9 per cent increase in the preceding
twelve months. Wholesale prices of farm products and
processed foods and feeds declined slightly over the
year ending in December, but these prices frequently
reflect special supply conditions, and for short periods
of time often follow trends independent of business
fluctuations in the economy. Consumer prices have
moderated since last April, rising at a 4.9 per cent
annual rate to November, compared with a 6 per cent
increase in the previous twelve months.
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other post World War II periods when the growth of
total spending slowed. The growth rate of raw indus-
trial material prices rose steadily in the last half of
1968 and 1969, reaching a peak in 1970. The growth of
wholesale industrial prices and consumer prices
reached peaks in the first half of 1970.
Since February 1970, the prices of raw industrial
materials have declined at an 11.7 per cent annual
rate. While these prices are highly responsive tochang-
ing demand and supply conditions, their decline
should not be viewed as conclusive evidence that
substantial improvement in inflation will follow. The
decline reflects international as well as domestic
market conditions,
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Slower growth in total spending and a growing la-
bor force resulted in a rising unemployment rate in
1970. Unemployment reachcd 6 per cent of the labor
force in December, compared with a 3.9 per cent rate
in January 1970. The average duration of unemploy-
ment increased from approximately 7.8 weeks late in
1969 to 9.2 weeks in the last quarter of 1970.
:idonctarq and Piscal Developments
The money stock rose 5.4 per cent from December
1969 to December 1970, compared with 3 per cent in
1969.1 In 1987 and 1968, when inflationary pressures
were intensifying, money expanded at about a 7.2
per cent annual rate. Time deposits have increased
at a rapid 23 per cent rate since February, to a large
extent the result of reintermediation associated with
the substantial decline in market interest rates this
year, and relaxation of Regulation Q ceilings on the
rates banks were permitted to pay on time deposits.
Several budget actions in 1970 contributed to in-
creases in disposable personal income. A 6 per cent
pay increase for Federal employees and an increase
in the Social Security benefit schedule were enacted
into law, both retroactive to the beginning of the year.
1
See “The Revised Money Stock: Explanation and Illustrations”
on pages 6-15 of this Reveiw, for a discussion of the recent
revisions of money stock data.
The tax surcharge was reduced to 5 from 10 per cent
on January 1, 1970, and expired on June 30. These
actions, together with lower-than-anticipated tax re-
ceipts associated with the economic slowdown, re-
sulted in a swing in the national income accounts
budget from a surplus of $9.3 billion in the calendar
year 1969 to a deficit at an $11.9 billion annual rate
in the third quarter of 1970.
cent of total spending in 1965 to 9 per cent in 1968,
and then declined to slightly less than 8 per cent in
1970. Since 1968, nondefense spending as a proportion
of total spending in the economy has expanded by
an arnonnt slightly greater than the decline in defense
spending as a proportion of total spending, so that
total Federal spending in 1970 were slightly higher
than in 1969.
Policy Dilemma
The problems facing stabilization authorities are
substantially different now than a year ago. At the
end of 1969 there was little qucstion that inflation
was the most important problem facing economic p01-
ieymakers. A year later the rate of price increase (as
Federal budget trends and priorities of the past
decade can be seen in the accompanying chart. Total
Federal spending increased from 18 per cent of total
spending in 1965 to an average of 21 per cent for the
years 1967 to 1970. Government spending for defense
and defense-related programs increased from 7 per
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measured by the GNP implicit price deflator) had
declined to about a 4.5 per cent annual rate,
while unemployment as a per cent of the civilian
work force had risen from 3.5 per cent to 6
per cent.
Few economic analysts would argue that the effort
to eliminate inflation should be abandoned to give full
attention to preventing further increases in unemploy-
ment. Similarly, few analysts would propose that the
level of unemployment should be disregarded and that
any amount of idle work force should be allowed to
occur, while the remaining forces of inflation are
purged from the economy. The approach to economic
stabilization taken in view of these circumstances will
depend on the consensus of policymakers regarding
two questions: how long will it be before the rate of
inflation subsides substantially if the policies of 1970
are continued in 1971; and what wifi be the likely
path of the unemployment rate in the interim? If the
time span required to stem inflation is considered to
be too long, or the contemplated average level of un-
employment is deemed to be too great, alternative
policies would be recommended by some, However,
an assessment of the most probable results of continu-
ing recent past policies should be made, before alter-
native courses are proposed.
A position which favors continuing the policies of
1970 is based to some extent upon the assumption that
people still anticipate rapid inflation, on the basis of
the last five years of inflation. Further, it is argued
that the current slowdown in business activity and the
associated rising unemployment were to be expected
and were necessary in order to eventually achieve a
continued reduction of the rate of inflation. It isprob-
ably neither desirable nor necessary, according to this
view, to reduce the rate of growth of total demand
for goods and services in the future below the rate of
1970, A substantial and prolonged increase in the
growth of total spending from the present rate, ini-
tiated by expansive monetary and fiscal actions, would
preclude further progress in controlling injiation.
A second position, which favors emphasizing a re-
duction in unemployment as the primary objective of
stabilization policy, argues that stabilization actions to
stimulate total spending would promptly accelerate
the growth of production and employment. Since there
currently exists excess labor and capital equipment, it
is argued that such stimulation would result in little
interruption in the rate of price decline, Only when
the gap between actual and potential output is sub-
stantially narrowed, it is contended, would there be a
danger of adding to inflationary forces.
The difference between these positions depends on
the weighting of economic objectives and the choice
of a time horizon in which to achieve the objectives.
If a decline in unemployment is the dominant, but
not the exclusive, objective of stabilization policy,
the goal of relative price stability will probably have
to be sacrificed in the near-term. If the reduction of
inflation is the dominant, but not the exclusive, ob-
jective of policy, a quicker reduction in inflation
might be obtained at the expense of temporarily
higher unemployment.
There is little direct historical evidence as to the
types of actions which are best suited to deal simul-
taneously with the problems of inflation and unem-
ployment. Indirect evidence of the likelihood of cer-
tain outcomes of various policy alternatives, however,
can be obtained from statistical studies of historical
relationships among economic magnitudes. Implica-
tions from such studies indicate the most pmbable
response of the economy to alternative stabilization
actions.
The results of recent studies by this Bank indicate
that a growth of the money stock at a 5 per cent rate
in 1971 would imply a 7 per cent increase in nominal
GNP for the four quarters of 1971. A price rise of
about 4 per cent and an unemployment rate of about
6per cent would be associated with this rate of growth
of total spending during 1971. Beyond 1971, a con-
tinuation of a 5 per cent rate of growth of money
would be conducive to further reduction in the rate
of inflation and some improvement in the level of
unemployment.
By comparison, an S per cent rate of increase in the
money stock during 1971 most likely would be asso-
ciated with about a 9 per cent rate of growth of
total spending, a 4.4 per cent rate of increase in prices,
and a 5.7 per cent unemployment rate, The rate of
inflation would remain high beyond 1971, even if a
slower growth in money were sought after 1971.
Strategies for Policy in 1971
Some persons who desire “full” employment within
the next year or two have suggested that it would be
desirable for real output to rise at about an 8 per cent
annual rate until full employment is achieved. It is
doubtful that this goal is attainable, given the current
state of the economy and the lagged effects of past
actions, Moreover, such a rapid expansion would
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probably revive expectations of rapid inflation, which
would cause substantial problems for stabilizing the
price level in the future. The course suggested to at-
tain the 8 per cent real growth would be to maintain
or accelerate the growth in Federal expenditures,
which would result in a $15 to $20 billion budget
(NIA) deficit in 1971 (but a near balance on the high-
employment accounts budget). The deficit might be
financed, in large part, by a more rapid monetary
expansion.
This expansive policy has appeal for those with
short time horizons for evaluation. However, when
judgment includes the effects beyond the present
year or so, the more expansionary course is not so
clearly desirable. The more moderate course, of con-
tinuing through 1971 to expand the money stock at
about the same rate achieved in 1970, would be con-
ducive to continued reduction in the rate of inflation
while allowing a resumption in the growth of real
product.
Inflation and inflationary expectations should con-
tinue to have a bearing on stabilization policy, al-
though this concern is likely to be tempered by greater
attention to unemployment than was the case only
three or four months ago. Relaxation of stabilization
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policies and resulting increased growth in spending
will cause a lengthening of the waiting period neces-
sary to stem inflation. If the relaxation is great, sub-
stantial spending increases may cause further infla-
tion, with employment benefits and increased growth
of real output only temporary.
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